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CLIMATE CHAOS 
by David A. Wirth 
For the past several years scientists have 
issued ominous warnings about the future of 
the earth's climate. Predictions of dramatic 
global change arising from the continued 
dumping of industrial by-products into the 
atmosphere and forest loss of massive scale can 
no longer be ignored. Compelling scientific 
evidence now strongly suggests that world 
climate patterns, previously regarded as reli- 
ably stable, could be thrust into a state of 
turmoil. Emissions of natural and synthetic 
gases are increasing the heat-trapping capacity 
of the atmosphere through a phenomenon 
known as the greenhouse effect. 
The projected effects of this worldwide 
climatic disruption dwarf many of the envi- 
ronmental problems of the past and augur 
political, economic, and social disruptions on 
an enormous scale. Global warming could 
have catastrophic onsequences for the habita- 
bility and productivity of the whole planet. 
The accompanying strain and upheaval on the 
international scene in turn could have serious 
foreign-policy consequences for all countries. 
Broad scientific agreement exists on the 
underlying theory of climate change, although 
the nature and magnitude of future effects 
from greenhouse warming as predicted by 
computer models remain in debate. Some of 
these, such as a rise in the sea level, have been 
established with greater certainty than others. 
Nonetheless, the range of consequences is 
sufficiently clear and the magnitude of the 
resources at stake so enormous that policy 
action is required sooner rather than later. 
Once a crisis has been reached, it will be too 
late to act. 
The international political and legal system 
remains ill-equipped to offer a solution that 
will assure the integrity of the earth's climate. 
DAVID A. WIRTH is a senior attorney at the Natural 
Resources Defense Council and former attorney-adviser 
for Oceans, International Environmental and Scientif- ic Affairs in the State Department's Office of the Legal 
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FOREIGN POLICY 
Although the greenhouse theory of warming 
has been accepted for about a century, policy- 
makers have only recently become aware of its 
significance for the global environment. The 
international community cannot afford to 
continue to delay elevating the greenhouse 
effect to the top of the foreign-policy agenda. 
Arresting the impending climate instability 
will require a concerted international agenda 
and a reorientation of energy and develop- 
ment priorities in virtually all countries of the 
world. Heading this agenda for action should 
be a global multilateral agreement that sets 
strict, binding standards for national emis- 
sions of greenhouse gases. 
Human activities since the Industrial Revo- 
lution have dramatically altered the composi- 
tion of the global atmosphere. A number of 
gases, emitted in small but significant 
amounts, absorb infrared radiation reflected 
from the surface of the earth. As the concen- 
trations of these heat-absorbing ases increase, 
average global temperatures will rise. 
Emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) are the 
single largest cause of elevated terrestrial 
temperatures from the greenhouse effect, ac- 
counting for approximately one-half of the 
problem. Concentrations of CO2 in the range 
of 280 parts per million (ppm), together with 
water vapor in the atmosphere, established the 
preindustrial equilibrium temperature of the 
planet. Since the middle of the 19th century 
atmospheric CO2 levels have increased by 
about 25 per cent to approximately 350 ppm 
and are continuing to rise by approximately .4 
per cent per year. Elevated CO2 concentra- 
tions result primarily from the intensified 
burning of fossil fuels-coal, oil, and natural 
gas-which liberates the chemical in varying 
amounts. Coal burning releases the most CO2, 
while the combustion of quantities of natural 
gas and oil needed to produce the same 
amount of energy results in only about 57 per 
cent and 83 per cent as much CO2, respective- 
ly. 
The world's forests are vast storehouses or 
"sinks" for carbon. Worldwide loss of forest 
cover, by releasing this vast stockpile of car- 
bon into the atmosphere as CO2, aggravates 
the greenhouse problem. Deforestation in 
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Third World countries is particularly severe, 
with the destruction of tropical forests in 
developing countries like Brazil and Indonesia 
exceeding 27 million acres annually from 
activities such as burning, logging, and con- 
version to agricultural and pastureland. In- 
deed, the release of CO2 into the atmosphere as 
a result of deforestation amounts to 2-10 
billion tons annually. 
Concentrations of a second important 
greenhouse gas, nitrous oxide (N20), have also 
been rising, probably because of heavier fossil- 
fuel use, greater agricultural activity, and 
other ecological disturbances. Average global 
atmospheric levels of N20 at the end of 1985 
were approximately 300 parts per billion (ppb) 
and are increasing at an annual rate of .2 per 
cent. Both CO2 and N20, unlike some conven- 
tional pollutants, are very stable compounds. 
CO2 remains in the upper atmosphere for 
decades after its release and N20 for consider- 
ably more than a century. Consequently, with- 
out major reductions in emissions of these 
gases with long atmospheric lifetimes, their 
concentrations will continue to grow. 
The international community can- 
not afford to delay elevating the 
greenhouse effect to the top of the 
foreign-policy agenda. 
A group of volatile chemicals known as 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) is believed to be 
currently responsible for 15-20 per cent of the 
global warming trend. These chemicals, un- 
like CO2, are strictly synthetic and are not 
known in nature. They have a number of uses 
as refrigerants, propellants, solvents, and ther- 
mal insulators. A related class of bromine- 
containing chemicals called "halons" are 
found in fire-extinguishing systems. Average 
global atmospheric concentrations of CFC-11 
and CFC-12, two of the most commercially 
important chlorofluorocarbons, in 1985 were 
approximately .22 ppb and .38 ppb, respective- 
ly. Atmospheric concentrations of CFC-11 and 
CFC-12 are growing at a rate of more than 7 
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per cent annually as a result of increased 
world production in recent years. 
Although their concentrations are small 
relative to that of CO2, CFCs are up to 10,000 
times more potent in absorbing infrared radia- 
tion. After release, CFCs and halons reside in 
the atmosphere for close to a century, or 
sometimes more, because of their great chemi- 
cal stability at low altitudes. Consequently, an 
immediate 85 per cent reduction in emissions 
of CFC-11 and CFC-12, for example, would be 
necessary merely to stabilize their atmospher- 
ic concentrations. With their long atmospher- 
ic lifetimes, CFCs and halons eventually reach 
the upper atmosphere. There, they are the 
principal culprits in the worldwide loss of the 
protective stratospheric ozone layer, which 
shields life on earth from harmful levels of 
ultraviolet solar radiation. 
Methane, the principal component of natu- 
ral gas, is another significant climate-modify- 
ing chemical. It has an atmospheric residence 
time of about 11 years. Average global concen- 
trations of methane were approximately 1,700 
ppb at the end of 1985 and are increasing by 
about 1 per cent per year, the highest rate of 
any naturally occurring greenhouse gas, for 
reasons that are not now clear. Animal hus- 
bandry and rice cultivation have been identi- 
fied as major sources of increased methane 
emissions. Coal mining and landfills are also 
significant sources, with large potential for 
rapid growth in the future. 
Low-level ozone is another greenhouse gas. 
Although ozone in the stratosphere is benefi- 
cial, this highly unstable chemical is the 
leading component of photochemical smog 
pollution at the earth's surface. 
While greenhouse gases are dispersed rela- 
tively quickly throughout the global atmos- 
phere after release, industrial emissions of 
these heat-absorbing chemicals are highly con- 
centrated in the developed world. In 1985, 23 
per cent of total global CO2 emissions of more 
than 20.5 billion tons of CO2 originated in the 
United States-the single largest emitting 
country and the highest per capita contributor 
among industrial countries to the greenhouse 
problem. The second biggest contribution 
came from the Soviet Union, with 19 per cent 
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of total CO2 emissions. Western Europe emit- 
ted 15 per cent of the total, Japan 5 per cent, 
and the People's Republic of China 11 per 
cent. Other developing countries together 
accounted for only 20 per cent of total indus- 
trial CO2 emissions. 
Emissions of CFCs are even more strongly 
skewed. In 1980 the United States produced 
roughly 28 per cent of the global total of 
approximately 817,300 tons of cFc-11 and 
CFC-12. Western Europe produced about 30 
per cent, industrialized Asian countries 12 per 
cent, and the East-bloc countries an estimated 
14 per cent. The entire developing world 
accounted for just slightly more than 2 per 
cent of this amount. 
Consequences of Greenhouse Warming 
An international scientific consensus now 
supports the assertion that the accumulation 
in the atmosphere of CO,, NO20, CFCs, meth- 
ane, and low-level ozone could have sweeping 
and far-reaching effects on the earth's 
climate.' By as early as the year 2030, the heat- 
retaining capacity of the atmosphere may have 
increased by an amount equivalent to dou- 
bling preindustrial concentrations of CO2. By 
1 Much of the scientific information in this article is drawn from the following reports: World Meteorologi- 
cal Organization and United Nations Environment 
Programme, Developing Policies for Responding to Climatic Change (Summary of workshops held in 
Villach, Austria, 28 September-2 October, 1987, and 
Bellagio, Italy, 9-13 November 1987 under the aus- 
pices of the Beijer Institute, Stockholm), 1988; Interna- 
tional Council of Scientific Unions, United Nations 
Environment Programme, and World Meteorological 
Organization, Report of the International Confer- 
ence on the Assessment of the Role of Carbon 
Dioxide and of Other Greenhouse Gases in 
Climate Variations and Associated Impacts (Re- 
port of a conference held under the auspices of the World Climate Program at Villach, Austria, 9-15 October 
1985), 1986; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
and United Nations Environment Programme, Ef- fects of Changes in Stratospheric Ozone and Global Climate (Proceedings of a conference held at 
Leesburg, Virginia, 16-20June 1986); U.S. Environ- 
mental Protection Agency, Assessing the Risks of Trace Gases That Can Modify the Stratosphere, 
vol. 3: chaps. 6-18, prepared for the Office of Air and Radiation by John S. Hoffman (Washington, D.C., 
1987); and Irving M. Mintzer, A Matter of De- 
grees: The Potential for Controlling the Green- 




the middle of the next century, average global 
temperatures may have risen by as much as 
3*F-9*F. The absolute magnitude of these 
temperatures, as well as the rapidity of tem- 
perature change, will exceed any previously 
experienced in human history. 
The effects of a greenhouse-driven climate 
disruption will be characterized with com- 
plete certainty only after significant damage 
has already occurred. However, among the 
most dramatic effects likely to ensue from 
greenhouse warming is an unprecedented rise 
in sea level resulting from thermal expansion 
of the oceans and melting of glaciers and polar 
ice. Over the past century the average global 
sea level has increased less than 6 inches. By 
contrast, the sea level will have accelerated 
considerably, producing a total increase of up 
to 1-7 feet by 2075, depending on the degree of 
global warming that occurs. 
The impact of sea-level rise in the United 
States is likely to be severe. The anticipated 
increase in the elevation of the oceans could 
permanently inundate low-lying coastal 
plains, accelerate the erosion of shorelines and 
beaches, increase the salinity of drinking-wa- 
ter aquifers and biologically sensitive estuar- 
ies, and increase the susceptibility of coastal 
properties to storm damage. An increase of 5- 
7 feet in sea level would submerge 30-80 per 
cent of America's coastal wetlands, which are 
crucial to the productivity of commercially 
important fisheries. Extensive existing coastal 
development may prevent the widespread 
formation of new wetlands. Even in undevel- 
oped coastal areas, the rapidity of the predict- 
ed sea-level rise will mean that existing wet- 
lands would be lost faster than new ones can 
be created. 
The increase in elevation of the oceans will 
also seriously affect the approximately 50 per 
cent of the earth's population that inhabits 
coastal regions. Entire countries, such as the 
Maldives, could disappear. A rise in sea level 
of only 3 feet could flood an area of the Nile 
Delta that constitutes 12-15 per cent of 
Egypt's arable land, produces a similar por- 
tion of the Egyptian annual gross national 
product (GNP), and is home to a comparable 
percentage of the country's 51.4 million peo- 
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pie. In Bangladesh, a 3-foot rise would inun- 
date 11.5 per cent of the country's land area, 
displace 9 per cent of the 112.3 million people 
in this densely populated country, and threat- 
en 8 per cent of the annual GNP. 
The range of uncertainties associated with 
local climatic changes is substantially larger 
than for global averages. The dramatic antici- 
pated increases in global temperature are 
virtually certain to cause a wide variety of 
modifications in regional climates. In middle 
latitudes, where the continental United States 
lies, summertime temperature increases are 
expected to exceed the global average by 30-50 
per cent. Forests, many of them economically 
productive, could begin to die off as early as 
the year 2000 if they prove unable to adjust to 
rapidly shifting climatic zones. Regions of 
agricultural productivity could shift at the 
expense of the American Midwest, which 
currently has some of the most fertile soils in 
the world. A warming of only 3.6*F could 
decrease wheat and cereal yields by 3-17 per 
cent. Computer models predict continental 
drying in middle latitudes, which means that 
parched soils, scorching droughts, and massive 
heat waves, like those that devastated crops in 
the Midwest in summer 1988, could become 
commonplace. Water levels in the Great Lakes 
could drop by a foot, interfering with naviga- 
tion for ocean-going vessels. Extreme tempera- 
tures have been shown to elevate human 
mortality. Some models also project disrup- 
tions in atmospheric and ocean circulation 
patterns. The impact of these changes is 
highly unpredictable. 
Countries with tropical climates could expe- 
rience especially severe consequences. Semiar- 
id areas like much of sub-Saharan Africa 
might suffer from even lower rainfall. Many 
semiarid areas are already marginal for agri- 
culture, are highly sensitive to changes in 
climate, and have had severe droughts and 
famines for the last several decades. Tropical 
humid climates could become hotter and wet- 
ter, with an increase in the frequency and 
severity of tropical storms. Floods, which 
between 1968 and 1988 killed more than 80,000 
people and affected at least 200 million more, 
could worsen. Natural disasters such as floods, 
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now unusual, could become increasingly com- 
mon. 
Indeed, climate disruption caused by the 
greenhouse effect may already be evident. 
Global temperatures in 1988 were again at or 
near the record for the period of instrumental 
data, with temperatures elevated by .7"F rela- 
tive to the average for the 30-year period 
beginning in 1950. The five warmest years in 
this century all occurred during the 1980s. 
Moreover, the rate of global warming for the 
past two decades was higher than any in 
recorded history. Whether the planet is al- 
ready experiencing greenhouse-driven warm- 
ing as measured against a background of 
natural temperature variability is still a sub- 
ject for debate. However, because there is a lag 
on the order of decades between emissions of 
greenhouse gases and their effects, the level of 
heat-absorbing chemicals already released into 
the atmosphere has irrevocably committed the 
world to an additional .9"F-2.7"F increase over 
the next 50 years even if the atmosphere's 
composition were stabilized today. 
The greenhouse effect, if unchecked, is 
likely to cause unpredictable disruptions in 
the balance of power worldwide, exacerbating 
the risk of war. The projected climate distur- 
bance and its accompanying impacts are suffi- 
ciently dramatic in quality, magnitude, and 
rapidity that policymakers should give the 
most serious consideration to the security 
implications of the ongoing failure to antici- 
pate and arrest greenhouse warming. The oil 
crises of the 1970s were widely perceived as a 
national security issue because excessive de- 
pendence on foreign oil threatened the Ameri- 
can economy. Prevention of global climate 
disruption demands the immediate attention 
of U.S. leaders for the same reason. But so far, 
the implications of the greenhouse phenome- 
non have not played the slightest role in long- 
term strategic planning by the government. 
The odds are strongly stacked against every 
country in the game of climate roulette. Con- 
trary to some speculation, it is very unlikely 
that any region of the world will be a net 
"winner" from climate change. The very 
concept of "winning" implies the existence of 
a stable warmer climate, which will not occur 
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unless the warming trend is halted. Even the 
limited goal of a steady-state warmer climate 
will require major policy reform. Otherwise, 
greenhouse-gas concentrations and global tem- 
peratures will continue to increase indefinite- 
ly, nullifying any short-term benefits. 
Even if a stable warmer climate were identi- 
fied as a policy goal, the rate of climate change 
resulting from greenhouse gases already in the 
atmosphere would be faster than ever experi- 
enced in human history. This climate alter- 
ation would undoubtedly result in decades of 
destruction resulting from an inability to alter 
human behavior, such as agricultural tech- 
niques, fast enough to take advantage of new 
weather patterns. The transition to warmer 
climates is expected to be highly disruptive 
and accompanied by an increase in the fre- 
quency, intensity, duration, and geographic 
extent of extreme weather events like 
droughts and storms. Moreover, sea-level rise 
would be certain to entail net harm the world 
over. No region or individual country should 
place the health and well-being of its public 
and environment at stake in what amounts to 
a crapshoot. 
While all countries are likely to be losers in 
the global climate gamble, some countries 
have more at stake than others. The United 
States has a particularly large investment in 
the status quo. Its current pre-eminence in 
world affairs ultimately derives from the 
strength of the country's economy. The pro- 
ductivity of the country's natural resources, 
such as the incomparably valuable farmland of 
the Midwest, was an essential prerequisite to 
America's elevation as a dominant superpower 
in the latter half of the 20th century. Impend- 
ing climate change means that this productivi- 
ty can no longer be taken for granted. The 
greenhouse effect threatens the overall health 
of the American economy and could require a 
massive diversion of resources to nonproduc- 
tive adaptive activities. 
The United States has one of the most 
productive agricultural sectors on earth, pro- 
ducing nearly 50 per cent of the world's corn 
and nearly 60 per cent of its soybeans. The 
United States is also the world's leading 
exporter of wheat and corn. By contrast, the 
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USSR is now the planet's largest importer of 
wheat and its second largest importer of corn. 
Climate models, however, suggest that this 
pattern could change dramatically if the Mid- 
west became 10-20 per cent drier and crop 
yields were reduced. The drought of 1988 
demonstrated that falling crop yields are a 
very real possibility. U.S. Department of 
Agriculture forecasts for the 1988-89 market- 
ing year project that domestic consumption 
and exports of U.S. grain and soybeans will 
exceed production by approximately 4.2 bil- 
lion bushels. At the same time, Soviet agricul- 
tural areas, located considerably farther north, 
could suffer smaller losses in productivity 
relative to their American counterparts. The 
difference between last summer's events and 
the effects of greenhouse-induced climate 
change would be that the latter is permanent 
and worsening, not just an isolated calamity. 
Adapting to future climate change is also 
likely to require significant resources in the 
United States. Fighting the effects of a rising 
sea level on the heavily developed coasts of the 
United States, where about 75 per cent of the 
U.S. population will reside by 1990, will be 
phenomenally expensive. Maintaining threat- 
ened shorelines just on the American East 
Coast by measures such as diking cities could 
cost $10-$100 billion for a 3-foot rise. Seven 
out of the 10 most populous cities in the 
United States are located either on the coasts 
or on coastal estuaries that would be severely 
affected by sea-level rise. By contrast, the 
USSR, which has relatively less exposed shore- 
line and considerably less investment in ex- 
pensive coastal infrastructure, would suffer 
little damage. Only 1 of the 10 largest Soviet 
cities--Leningrad- would face significant 
problems from an elevation in sea level. More- 
over, the Soviet Union could benefit greatly 
from improved navigability in its polar coastal 
areas as Arctic ice melts. 
The effects of greenhouse warming will also 
be felt in other parts of the world, potentially 
fueling turbulent regional conflicts that could 
upset the existing global balance of power. 
Loss of low-lying territory could create refu- 
gee problems of an unprecedented scale. Inun- 
dation of just the tiny island country of the 
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Maldives would require the relocation of 
nearly 200,000 people. Competition over terri- 
tory and natural resources launched by those 
displaced by sea-level rise could create or 
exacerbate regional strife. Pressure from the 
10 million individuals in Bangladesh that 
would be uprooted by a 3-foot sea-level rise 
could heighten regional tensions. Famine 
created by greenhouse-driven crop failures 
could also generate regional clashes that might 
encourage the major powers to take sides. 
Such an acceleration in showdowns among the 
superpowers would destabilize the world po- 
litical balance in highly unpredictable ways, 
tempting those countries that already have a 
tendency toward global adventurism and plac- 
ing U.S. security interests at risk. 
Arresting Climate Change 
The worst effects of a greenhouse-induced 
climate cataclysm can be averted. And the 
sooner action is taken, the more effective it 
will be. Conversely, the longer a policy re- 
sponse is delayed, the greater the warming 
that will have accumulated "in the bank" and 
the more radical the measures that will be 
required to prevent further climatic upheaval. 
CFCs and halons are by far the easiest 
component of the greenhouse problem to 
eliminate. Motivated by concern over the 
pivotal role these chemicals play in depleting 
the stratospheric ozone layer, 45 countries and 
1 international organization have signed the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances That De- 
plete the Ozone Layer, which took effect at 
the beginning of 1989 after negotiations spon- 
sored by the United Nations Environment 
Programme. The agreement overcame a seri- 
ous lapse of concern about this issue by U.S. 
and European policymakers in the early 1980s 
and a complete breakdown of negotiations in 
1985. Aside from representing a diplomatic 
milestone for international cooperation on 
environmental problems, the Montreal Proto- 
col is also an important precedent for a 
multilateral strategy on the more challenging 
issue of greenhouse warming. 
The Montreal Protocol requires an incre- 
mental 50 per cent reduction in the consump- 
tion of five ozone-depleting CFCs by the end 
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of this century. Beginning in July 1989 con- 
sumption of these substances must be frozen 
at 1986 levels. A reduction of 20 per cent must 
be achieved beginning 4 years later and an 
additional 30 per cent beginning in July 1998. 
The agreement permits each country to imple- 
ment these requirements as it chooses through 
recycling, destruction, or abandonment of 
unnecessary uses of these chemicals. However, 
the overall strategy is to stimulate the develop- 
ment of alternatives to existing CFCs by 
constricting supply. The Montreal Protocol 
contains ground-breaking trade incentives for 
broad participation, including a ban on im- 
ports of controlled substances from countries 
that are not party to the accord. Its provisions 
dealing specifically with developing countries 
resolve delicate equity issues by allowing 
Third World countries a 10-year grace period 
to make required reductions. 
Despite the precedential importance of the 
Montreal Protocol, the agreement is inade- 
quate. Because of loopholes and leakages built 
into the document, the actual reductions in 
emissions of substances controlled by the 
protocol will be only about one-third under 
even the most optimistic assumptions. Con- 
sumption of halons, which are up to 10 times 
as destructive of ozone as the strongest CFC, is 
merely leveled off and not reduced. The 
agreement explicitly specifies that produc- 
tion-as distinct from consumption-of CFCs 
and halons may actually increase by as much 
as 10 per cent over the 1986 level. 
It is now clear that emissions of CFCs and 
halons must be virtually eliminated because of 
the overwhelming risks these chemicals pose 
to climate and stratospheric ozone. Soon after 
the Montreal Protocol was signed in Septem- 
ber 1987, a seasonal thinning of 50 per cent of 
the ozone layer over Antarctica-the ozone 
"hole"-was conclusively connected to CFCs. 
New and widely accepted scientific evidence 
documents that average global losses in strato- 
spheric ozone of about 3 per cent-two to 
three times that previously predicted by com- 
puter models-have already occurred.2 Even 
2U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
"Executive Summary of the Ozone Trends Panel," 1988. 
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if CFCs and halons are phased out within 5-7 
years, the long atmospheric lifetimes of these 
chemicals mean that the environment could 
take up to a century to recover. Moreover, 
even if production of these dangerous chemi- 
cals were to be eliminated altogether, they 
would continue to seep out of the existing 
stock of refrigerators, air conditioners, insula- 
tion, and other repositories. 
To stabilize global concentrations of CO2 
gas it will be necessary to cut global emissions 
of CO2 by at least one-half. Burning fossil fuels 
releases most of the excess CO2 in the atmo- 
sphere. Because no economical technology for 
removing CO2 from waste-gas streams is now 
available, cutting back releases of CO2 will 
require a lower total energy consumption and 
a shift in energy sources toward low- or non- 
CO2-emitting technologies. Greenhouse im- 
pacts should be an explicit part of all future 
decision-making processes in the energy sec- 
tor. Reductions in fossil-fuel use will also help 
to ease other environmental problems associ- 
ated with current patterns of energy use, such 
as acid rain and local air pollution. 
Even with the most optimistic assumptions 
about economic growth, major reductions in 
CO2 emissions from industrialized countries 
can be achieved with energy conservation, 
efficiency technologies, and renewable energy 
sources. For example, the 1,200 kilowatt-hours 
per year used by a typical frost-free refrigera- 
tor can be reduced to only 500 with a state-of- 
the-art model. Current technology can light an 
office building with an expenditure of only .55 
watts per square foot, as little as one-fifth of 
today's average. It is now possible to produce 
motor vehicles-which currently account for 
more than one-fourth of greenhouse gases 
released in the United States-that have fuel 
economies of up to 98 miles per gallon, 2-5 
times as efficient as those now on the road. 
Efficiency improvements have meant that 
the amount of energy used in the United 
States today is about the same as in 1973, 
despite a 40 per cent increase in GNP during 
the same period. Application of existing effi- 
ciency technologies could reduce U.S. CO, 
emissions by 14-18 per cent by the end of the 
century. In California alone, a steady improve- 
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ment in efficiency of 3.4 per cent per year has 
been achieved over the past 12 years with only 
mild encouragement from state and local 
governments through policy measures to en- 
courage conservation and efficiency. Through 
a strategy involving efficiency improvements, 
national progress could be much faster. 
Nuclear energy has been proposed in some 
quarters as the preferred solution to the prob- 
lem of greenhouse warming. Although atomic 
power is a CO,-free technology, its other risks 
currently make it the least attractive alterna- 
tive to fossil fuels. Nuclear energy carries the 
inherent danger of weapons proliferation. The 
current generation of nuclear reactors still 
entails the unacceptable danger of accidents 
and suffers from a critical lack of public 
confidence in an increasingly large number of 
countries. The problem of disposing of waste 
that will remain hazardously radioactive for 
many hundreds of thousands of years has yet 
to be adequately solved. Of the alternative 
strategies for reducing CO2 emissions, nuclear 
energy is among the most expensive. More- 
over, to reduce CO2 emissions by 50 per cent 
by the year 2020 solely through the expansion 
of the nuclear industry would require bring- 
ing a new plant on line somewhere in the 
world at the rate of almost one a day starting 
in the mid-1990s--clearly a practical impossi- 
bility. While the nuclear option may be wor- 
thy of consideration as part of the public 
debate on ultimate solutions to the greenhouse 
problem, increased reliance on nuclear power 
at present would be both politically infeasible 
and irresponsible when major, cheap reduc- 
tions in CO2 emissions are available with 
existing technologies. 
Reversing deforestation and creating new 
forested areas will help to offset current levels 
of CO2 emissions. New forests, in absorbing 
CO2 from the air during photosynthesis, will 
contribute to climate stabilization by serving 
as supplementary reservoirs for carbon. Ag- 
gressive policies to conserve existing forests 
and create new forested areas will yield other 
significant environmental benefits, including 
erosion control and the preservation of a rich 
diversity of species whose genetic potential is 
only now becoming accessible to humankind. 
16. 
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The fundamentals of the greenhouse phe- 
nomenon are now well understood and the 
need for swift policy responses firmly estab- 
lished. While these responses are being imple- 
mented, the development and dissemination of 
technologies to combat climate disturbance- 
such as CFC-free, energy-efficient refrigera- 
tors and low-methane strains of rice-should 
be a high priority. Increased basic research to 
resolve remaining uncertainties concerning 
the magnitude, rate, and effects of greenhouse 
warming should also be undertaken. 
The Role of Developing Countries 
An equitable response to the special needs 
of developing countries is crucial to removing 
greenhouse threats to the global climate. On 
the one hand, developing countries have 
caused little of the problem and industrialized 
countries must bear the bulk of the blame. On 
the other hand, as economic development 
accelerates, Third World countries may ac- 
count for the preponderance of greenhouse- 
gas emissions by the middle of the next 
century. An international solution that pro- 
vides incentives for the participation of devel- 
oping countries while fairly distributing the 
responsibility for implementing solutions is 
essential to a successful global strategy for 
combating greenhouse warming. 
The consequences of the greenhouse effect 
strongly suggest that it is in the self-interest of 
Third World countries to re-examine expedi- 
tiously their energy priorities. Developing 
countries, with fewer resources to adapt to 
environmental disturbances, stand to suffer 
disproportionately from a rapid climate 
change. For example, the productivity of com- 
mon rice varieties falls off dramatically at 
temperatures just a few degrees higher than 
those currently prevailing in many rice-grow- 
ing areas. 
Tapping the tremendous potential for con- 
servation and improved end-use efficiency in 
the developing world would contribute to a 
solution for greenhouse warming while meet- 
ing much of the Third World's growing 
energy needs. This strategy also avoids other 
serious environmental and social problems, 
such as land degradation, local air pollution, 
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and population displacement, that accompany 
the building of fossil-fuel-fired power installa- 
tions. By the year 2020 it may be possible to 
achieve a universal standard of living far 
beyond that necessary to satisfy basic needs 
with little or no increase in global energy 
consumption from today's levels.3 However, 
many developing countries use energy in a 
highly inefficient manner. Macroeconomic 
policies in many developing countries, such as 
electricity price subsidies, discourage conser- 
vation and efficiency improvements. Firms in 
Brazil, where electricity prices are subsidized, 
manufacture energy-efficient air conditioners 
for export but cheap, inefficient models for 
domestic consumption. 
Investments in efficiency gains are extreme- 
ly attractive from many points of view. They 
require less capital and less foreign exchange 
than do comparable amounts of new power 
supply, contributing to overall economic pro- 
ductivity. Through efficiency and conserva- 
tion, developing countries could avoid at least 
$1.4 trillion in power-supply expansion costs 
between now and the year 2008. 
Efficiency investments represent a major 
opportunity for donors like the United States 
and the World Bank to assist developing 
countries in making energy choices that both 
avoid mistakes made earlier in the developed 
world and reduce risks to the entire planet 
from greenhouse warming. Nonetheless, de- 
velopment assistance in the environmentally 
sensitive energy sector often exacerbates the 
threat of greenhouse warming by emphasizing 
conventional sources of energy, such as mas- 
sive fossil-fuel-fired power plants. 
The World Bank, which controls an annual 
energy lending portfolio averaging $3.5 bil- 
lion, is one of the principal donors supporting 
power generation projects in the Third 
World. Through measures such as pricing 
reforms and improvements in the operation of 
existing power plants and distribution sys- 
3See, for example, World Bank, End-Use Electricity Conservation Options for Developing Countries, 
Energy Department Paper no. 32 (Washington, D.C., 
1986); and Jose Goldemberg et al., Energy for a Sustainable World (Washzngton, D.C.: World Re- 
sources Institute, 1987). 
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tems, the Bank has already made a commit- 
ment to encourage conservation and the effi- 
cient use of energy. There is, however, consid- 
erably more that the Bank can do. 
The Bank requires preparation of a "least 
cost plan" to precede investments in the 
energy sector. Current methodologies for 
these studies primarily address strategies for 
increasing energy supply. Support for demand 
reduction measures, such as end-use efficiency 
improvements, which are often economically 
as well as environmentally superior to invest- 
ments in supply, have not consistently been 
considered as alternatives to conventional 
power generation projects in Bank energy- 
sector strategies. Expanding the universe of 
alternatives to include demand reduction op- 
tions would simultaneously help developing 
countries reduce the rate of growth in their 
power-generating capacity and reduce green- 
house-gas emissions without sacrificing the 
energy needed for economic development. 
Additional staff trained in strategies for en- 
couraging end-use efficiency improvements 
would significantly increase the Bank's capa- 
bilities in this crucial area. 
Forest policy is another area where develop- 
ment assistance can provide benefits to Third 
World countries while simultaneously cutting 
emissions of greenhouse gases. While there has 
been great concern in North America and 
Western Europe about destruction of tropical 
forests, donor countries historically have de- 
voted little capital to conservation of this 
crucial resource and have earmarked even less 
for the creation of new forest areas. Case 
studies have documented that projects fi- 
nanced with little regard for the integrity of 
natural resources by donors such as the World 
Bank have seriously exacerbated forest loss in 
key countries such as Brazil and Indonesia. 
Industrialized countries can also help to re- 
verse tropical deforestation and encourage 
reforestation through changes in domestic 
policies. Developed countries provide the pri- 
mary market for tropical hardwoods, virtually 
all of which are unsustainably harvested, and 
firms based in industrialized countries often 
reap the profits of this trade. Governments of 
industrialized countries can take a serious look 
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at controlling trade in tropical woods and 
compensate exporting countries for lost reve- 
nues through alternative investments. 
The Third World debt crisis presents major 
opportunities for encouraging better forest 
management in developing countries. As the 
market value of such debt has fallen, a number 
of private banks have sold debt owed to them 
by Third World governments to private con- 
servation organizations, which have then for- 
given the debt in return for specific promises 
by the governments concerned, such as a 
commitment to conserve a particular area and 
to support its maintenance with a stream of 
payments in local currency. Such "debt for 
nature" swaps are already in place in Bolivia, 
Costa Rica, and Ecuador, and more are under 
negotiation. Governments can adopt policies, 
such as tax incentives, that encourage creditor 
banks to sell debt for swaps. Creditor gov- 
ernments can reduce interest or principal on 
sovereign debt in return for promises of policy 
reform in this critical sector. 
Coordinating policies on the international 
level to fight greenhouse warming will maxi- 
mize environmental and foreign-policy bene- 
fits. Unilateral reductions in releases of green- 
house gases by large emitters such as the 
United States and the Soviet Union will go a 
long way toward arresting global climate 
disruption. However, a multilateral consensus 
strategy will further the crucial goals of creat- 
ing incentives for universal participation and 
establishing an equitable balancing of respon- 
sibility for solving the problem. 
Existing international mechanisms are an 
important part of such a strategy. A reassess- 
ment of the Montreal Protocol, a process that 
is provided for by the document itself, is the 
most expeditious way to eliminate the contri- 
butions CFCs and halons make to the global 
warming problem. The World Bank's institu- 
tional structure also includes mechanisms for 
member countries to redirect priorities in the 
critical energy and forest sectors. 
The remainder of the greenhouse problem 
could be handled most effectively through a 
multilateral treaty, with standards binding 
under international law that would require 
each country to take prescribed actions to 
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reduce and halt greenhouse warming. Consid- 
erable precedent is now in place for multina- 
tional environmental agreements containing 
strict regulatory standards. In addition to the 
Montreal Protocol, which is an ancillary 
agreement to the 1985 Vienna Convention for 
the Protection of the Ozone Layer, several 
other international agreements establish re- 
quirements for controlling emissions of specif- 
ic air pollutants. The Protocol on the Reduc- 
tion of Sulphur Emissions or Their Trans- 
boundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Percent and 
the Protocol Concerning the Control of Emis- 
sions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboun- 
dary Fluxes-both auxiliary agreements to 
the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Trans- 
boundary Air Pollution-set out precise regu- 
latory limitations on releases of specified 
chemicals. Principles established in the case 
law of international tribunals and in the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration adopted by the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environ- 
ment also discouraged countries from acting 
in ways that could harm the environment in 
another's territory. 
A multilateral treaty designed to arrest 
global climate change should satisfy several 
basic requirements. First, it must require 
reductions in releases of greenhouse gases of a 
magnitude and speed sufficient to stabilize the 
earth's climate. The most important gas to 
control is CO2, for which global reductions of 
at least 50 per cent are necessary. Participating 
countries should accomplish these reductions 
by means of environmentally and economical- 
ly sound technologies that do not present 
unacceptable risks to public health or global 
security. The creation of new forested areas 
might be encouraged by allowing credits 
against reductions of CO2 emissions that 
would otherwise be required and by provi- 
sions establishing or promoting forestry pro- 
grams. Because the agreement could be ex- 
pected to cover a large number of emissions 
sources, it should mandate strict mechanisms 
for enforcement through reporting of emis- 
sions, on-site audits, and internationally con- 
trolled remote sensing. 
Second, the responsibility for making re- 
ductions must be distributed equitably. 
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Among the criteria that could be applied is 
relative national wealth as measured by per 
capita GNP. Another test could be per capita 
emissions of CO2, with the highest reductions 
required of those countries with the highest 
emissions per unit of population. Another 
possibility would be to require the imposition 
of a fee for carbon emissions, either as a 
primary mechanism for achieving reductions 
or as a supplementary measure. Any of these 
formulas would require proportionally greater 
cutbacks by the wealthiest countries and leave 
the poorest countries with the fewest con- 
straints on CO2 emissions. All countries would 
be encouraged to use existing energy supplies 
more efficiently. 
A treaty should also require a commitment 
from the wealthier countries for increased 
research into non-CO2 energy supply technol- 
ogies and development assistance to help poor- 
er countries meet the requirements imposed 
on them by the agreement. One mechanism 
for generating the necessary capital is to 
require countries to contribute to a fund in 
proportion to their CO2 emissions. Restricting 
access to this fund to those countries that 
accepted the obligations of the treaty would 
create incentives for broad participation. 
Considering the importance of the re- 
sources at risk, it would be nothing short of 
reckless to continue with business as usual. A 
failure to respond to the threat of greenhouse 
warming would amount to an affirmative 
decision to wager the health and well-being of 
current and future generations against over- 
whelming odds. 
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